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KYONG-DEOCK KANG 
Gramsci and Althusser: the theorists of  topography? 
 
 
1. The Crisis of  Marxism 
 
During 1977-78, Althusser declared the crisis of  Marxism and undertook criticism 
of  the PCF, which, according to Anderson, represents “the most violent oppositional 
charter within a party in the post-war period of  Western Communism”1. In the process, 
Althusser identified two major theoretical gaps in Marxism: the theorization of  political 
organization (party) and of  the labor movement. The lack of  such theories was, for 
Althusser, detrimental to the fusion of  theory and practice. What was peculiar to this 
identification of  the crisis of  Marxism was that Althusser associated it with an idealist  
aspect of  Marx himself. The contradictions in Marxism, for Althusser, lay not merely in 
the political or practical errors of Marxist movements, but were rooted in theoretical 
defects/contradictions in Marxism: the crisis of  Marxism “does not take place outside 
of the theoretical sphere”2. Considering his earlier position, this identification of  defects 
within Marxism was not without an impact on Althusser’s own theoretical achievement. 
Whereas Althusser had insisted that Capital broke with Hegelian idealist elements almost 
completely, now he discovered traces of  idealism in it – Marx tended to “put the state in 
virtually direct relation with the property relation”, and “hence […] with the productive 
relations characteristic of a given mode of  production”3. So, Althusser in his earlier work 
is not free from his later criticism of  the idealist aspect of  Marxism and the PCF. 
However, Althusser’s later formulation of  the materialism of  topography provides, if  
not an answer, at least a theoretical tool to rethink the problem of  the state and labor 
movement by concretizing his formulation of  ideology. So, this paper focuses on a 
tension with regard to the theory of  political organization and ideology in Althusser’s 
work and attempts to reconstruct Althusser’s oeuvre, i.e. his reinterpretation of  historical 
materialism, in terms of  the materialism of  topography.  
Generally accepting Althusser’s verdict on the crisis of  Marxism, we can find an 
unusual exception to it: Gramsci. The peculiarity of  Gramsci’s interpretation and 
elaboration of  Marxism can only be accounted for against the political/theoretical 
background of  the crisis of  Marxism. Gramsci was one of  the first to recognize that the 
crisis of  Marxism was not just political but theoretical: the crisis was also rooted in 
Marx’s own problematic. He was also the rare exception to recognize the turning point 
of  the crisis of  Marxism in the early 20th century – the emergence of  fascism: he noticed 
an opening for populist demagogy under the influence of  the mass media earlier than 
the Frankfurt theorists. In a nutshell, what binds Althusser and Gramsci together is the 
crisis of  Marxism, and then we can ask whether Gramsci provides a clue to resolve what 
Althusser identifies as the fundamental lacks in Marxism. Althusser’s anti-teleology is 
                                                 
1 P. Anderson, Argument within English Marxism, London, New Left Books, 1980, p. 113. 
2 L. Althusser, The Crisis of Marxism, “Marxism Today”, July 1978, pp. 215-221: 216. 
3 L. Althusser, Philosophy of the Encounter. Later Writings 1978-1987, trans. by G. M. Goshgarian, London, 
Verso, 2006, p. 97. 
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fundamentally antithetical to Gramsci’s historicism4, but Gramsci’s hegemony, as Buci-
Glucksmann points out, proposes the dynamics of  the superstructure by “put[ting] the 
state in the first line of  a society’s processes of  organization and reorganization”5. This, 
in many aspects, coincides with Althusser’s concept of  the ideological state apparatuses. 
So, if  we have the courage to assume a partial point of  view rather than pursuing a 
theoretical consistency of  Gramsci’s work, as Frosini suggests6, we could probably find 
in Gramsci what Althusser wants for Marxism particularly (in terms of  political 
organization). From this perspective, we will compare Althusser’s theory with Gramsci’s 
focusing on their formulations of  the state and the conception of  topography; here 
Gramsci’s concept of  the integral state is crucial for grasping the dialectical meaning of  
hegemony in that it addresses and shifts the meaning of  hegemony in terms of  
apparatus.   
 
 
2. The Integral State  
 
If  not as much as Althusser’s, Gramsci undergoes significant theoretical shifts in 
his theoretical trajectory. In particular, the meaning of  hegemony changes in its relation 
to the state. Gramsci’s first formulation of  hegemony involves the mutual exclusivity of  
the state and civil society: hegemony pertains to civil society and coercion to the State7. 
As is well known, the first distinction was adopted to account for the differential political 
structure of  East and West, and in particular confirmed the preponderance of  civil 
society over the State in the West.  
What is problematic with this formulation is that it disregards the fact that the 
state plays a central role in the formation and maintenance of  ideological 
consent/hegemony even in the West. The imperialist expansion of  the European nation 
states in the late 19th and early 20th centuries required an internal ideological coherence 
within the nation state. Or it can be said that bourgeoisies in the European nations 
actively exploited the state apparatuses to form ideological consent and displace conflicts 
from their national boundaries to the international terrain, without which it is hard to 
understand the appearance of  Nazism and European fascism, and the theme of  the 
national popular will. Even in the 1920s and 1930s, which mark a turning point in the 
crisis of  Marxism, the role of the state does not so much shrink or diminish as intensify 
in the formation of  national consent, as is indicated by Braudel’s famous formulation 
                                                 
4 See A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks¸ London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, p. 445. As 
Callinicos explains, the real, for Gramsci, is a “historical goal, to be attained as the creation of  a 
communist society” (A. Callinicos, Althusser’s Marxism, London, Pluto, 1976, p. 24). Gramsci 
presupposes a practical unity of  the conception of  the world and history. In particular, he is insistent 
upon cultural unity (“a unified cultural system”). See also L. Althusser, E. Balibar, Reading Capital, transl. 
by B. Brewster, London, Verso, 1997, pp. 130-132. 
5 Ch. Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, transl. by D. Fernbach, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 
1980, p. 61. 
6 F. Frosini, “Beyond the Crisis of  Marxism: Gramsci’s Contested Legacy”, in J. Bidet, S. Kouvelakis 
(eds.), Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism, Brill, Leiden 2008, p. 673. 
7 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, cit., p. 170. 
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that “capitalism only triumphs when it becomes identified with the state, when it is the 
state”8.  
Another problem is related to the question of historical transition. Gramsci’s first 
model of  hegemony implies that “the power of  capital essentially or exclusively takes the 
form of  cultural hegemony in the West”9. According to Anderson, it contains an 
element of  reformism in that it means that a socialist revolution can take place without 
the seizure and transformation of state power. So, Anderson argues that, though 
Gramsci himself  did not draw a reformist conclusion from it, it would not be entirely 
arbitrary interpretation if  we read Gramsci’s formulation into reformism10. Setting aside 
the problem of reformism, what is at issue with Gramsci’s first formulation of  
hegemony is that it assumes an exclusive relationship between consent and domination, 
and thereby fails to grasp an important nature of  capitalism: civil society is not separable 
from the state but rather its domain is intersected by the state. 
The distinction between East and West based upon the hegemony/domination 
distribution causes a problem in understanding the East as well. The active intervention 
of  the state, which Gramsci associates with domination, is not an exceptional 
phenomenon in the West, nor simply applicable to the analysis of  the East. Gramsci 
infers the specificity of  East from the fact that the state is powerful in the east, but this 
entails a problem when we attempt to apply it to analyze the Asian societies, e.g., China. 
It is generally said that China has had strong state apparatuses, but the ground of  civil 
society has been relatively weak: “in Russia [in the East], the State was everything, civil 
society was primordial and gelatinous”11. But the state apparatuses in China have been 
based upon very strong ideological backgrounds since early times as indicated by 
Confucianism. So, Gramsci’s early distinction of  West and East based upon the 
dichotomy of  consent/domination fails to give a proper understanding of  the state both 
in East/West, or at least is too narrow to generalize the Eastern societies12. 
 
Hegemony Domination 
Consent Coercion 
Civil society State  
 
Gramsci’s later reformulation of  hegemony shows that he was aware of  the 
inadequacy of his first model particularly in understanding the role of  the state for 
securing ideological consent in civil society. So, his second formulation of  hegemony 
reconceptualizes the relationship between the state and civil society: hegemony is 
redefined to combine coercion and consent and redistributed between the state and civil 
                                                 
8  F. Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977, pp. 64-65. 
9 P. Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, “New Left Review”, 1977, n. 100, pp. 5-78: 41. 
10 Ibid., p. 46. According to Laclau and Mouffe, Gramsci shares Bernstein’s “revisionism” but not his 
“gradualism”. E. Laclau, Ch. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
London, Verso, 1985, p. 71. 
11 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks¸ cit., p. 238. 
12 P. Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, cit., p. 22. 
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society13. With this theoretical rearrangement, which locates hegemony both in the state 
and civil society, the state appears as form of  apparatus. In this formulation, the 
distinction between civil society and political society is maintained , but hegemony not 
just works on civil society but intersects both civil society and the state14. This was not 
Gramsci’s final version of  hegemony, however. In the third version of  hegemony, the 
scope of  the state becomes extensive to include political society and civil society: 
“integral state”. The state no longer appears as “an external and dispensable surface”, 
but subsumes civil society within it: “hegemony protected by the armour of  coercion”15. 
So, as Anderson explains, hegemony is firmly situated within the state – no longer 
confined to civil society.16 The distinction between civil and political society is now 
effectively displaced into the problematic of  the state .  
 
The state is the entire complex of  practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class 
not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of  those over 
whom it rules17.  
 
The state encompasses political society and civil society and coercion and consent 
become coextensive with the state18. As Buci-Glucksmann points out, we can read the 
expansion of  the state concept in this model. Perry Anderson regards this theoretical 
shift as a retreat in that it “undermines any attempt to define the specificity of  bourgeois 
democracy in the West” (inadequate for distinguishing between the normal bourgeois 
parliamentary regime and forms such as the Fascist state)19. Despite Anderson’s criticism, 
the concept of  the integral state has a theoretical meaning in that it concretizes 
hegemony in terms of  state apparatus. With the introduction of  the integral state, the 
“distinction between state and civil society itself  is canceled”20. In addition, even though 
its original aim may not be properly fulfilled, it produces a much wider theoretical effect. 
The last model of  hegemony posits a general mechanism which goes beyond the 
European bourgeois states by “involv[ing] an incorporation of  hegemony and its 
apparatus into the state”21, which allows one to think of  superstructural phenomena 
depending upon the differential combination of  consent and coercion. On this point, 
Thomas writes:   
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 31, A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks¸ cit., pp. 261, 160. See also p. 239.    
14 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks¸ cit., p. 263 
15 Ch. Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, cit., p. 91; A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks¸ 
cit., p. 263. 
16 P. Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, cit., p. 23.  
17 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks¸ cit., p. 244. Or it can be said that he meaning of  
hegemony “extends to cover the structures of  the state”. See Ch. Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the 
State, cit., p. 93. 
18 P. Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, cit., p. 13.  
19 Ibid., p. 36: “For once the position is adopted that all ideological and political superstructures – 
including the family, reformist trade unions and parties, and private media  – are by definition State 
apparatuses, in strict logic it becomes impossible and unnecessary to distinguish between bourgeois 
democracies and fascism”. 
20 Ibid., p. 34. 
21 Ch. Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, cit., 70. 
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Co-ordination of  social forces in civil society occurs predominantly by what appear to be 
consensual means; but insofar as the space of  the “private” can only be established juridically, it 
presupposes the prior intervention of  the political power of  the state22. 
 
With the introduction of  the “integral state” , consent and coercion, base and 
superstructure, domination and hegemony do not appear as independent entities, but as 
dialectical articulation within a larger unitary apparatus23, which can be seen as an 
attempt to think the superstructure in terms of  its own internal logic or mechanism. So 
Peter Thomas writes: 
 
Whereas Marx and Engels’ tract has often been read […] with an eye to its focus upon the 
bourgeoisie’s revolutionizing of  the mode of  production, Gramsci places the accent upon the Manifesto’s 
complementary political thesis that these transformations have been accompanied, in a complex relation 
of  dialectical interaction, by an accompanying revolutionizing of  the nature of  the political and i ts 
concrete institutional forms24. 
 
It is possible to detect (from Gramsci’s formulation of  the state) the dynamics of  
political institutions which operates independently of  the causality of  the mode of  
production. Thus regarded, Gramsci’s concept of  hegemonic apparatus marks a break in 
the Marxist theory of  the state since it provides a reference with which to think of  what 
Althusser identifies as the fundamental gap in Marxism, and it is the concept of  the 
integral state as an apparatus that realizes this dynamic. On this point, Buci-Glucksmann 
writes: 
 
The expansion of  the state concept, by incorporating into it the hegemonic apparatuses, also 
presupposes the expansion of  the state apparatus. This double dialectical process permits a 
differentiated approach to the class/state relationship on the basis of  the mediations class/society and 
state/society. These mediations, linkages and footholds form the concrete dialectics of  the relationship 
between base and superstructure25.  
 
The reconstruction of the relationship of  hegemony and the state by the concept 
of  the integral state gives some degree of  autonomy to the state, but this is not to say 
that the state is the political itself  (the autonomy of  the state). The introduction of  
apparatus does not equate the state with politics, but inscribes another regulating 
mechanism (mediated by state apparatuses) between the political and its conditions as 
Marx does with the problematic of  the mode of  production – this implies the 
apparatuses are not reducible to the materialization and condensation of  class relation 
conditioned by the mode of  production. Moreover, the concept of  the state as apparatus, 
as Buci-Glucksmann stresses, is particularly important and inevitable in accounting for a 
dialectical link between the state and the Marxist problematic of  the withering away of  
                                                 
22 P. D. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment. Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism, Leiden, Brill, 2009, p. 192.  
23 Ch. Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, cit., p. 49. 
24 P. D. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, cit., p. 143. 
25 Ch. Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, cit., pp. 105-106.  
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the state26: without the materiality of  institutions denoted by hegemonic apparatuses, it is 
practically impossible to account for its withering away unless it turns to a teleological 
notion of  history or the autonomy of  subject in history.  
Gramsci’s rearrangement of  the relations between civil society and political 
society in general can be seen as an attempt to redefine the definition of the political by 
finding a general mechanism governing the working of  the state. If  this is the case, the 
shift from the second model of  hegemony to the third model is understandable in terms 
of  the internal logic of Gramsci’s theory against Anderson’s primary objection to it. In 
his formulation of  civil society and political society, Gramsci does not relate civil society 
directly to the terrain of  economy, i.e., the mode of  production, but rather regards it as 
one aspect of  the superstructural level. So, the “political” as mediated by the state (as 
state apparatuses) seems to consist of  the two aspects, political society and civil society. 
This distinction, which conceives of  political society and civil society as if  they are two 
attributes of  the state apparatus, has a theoretical advantage in that it manages to remove 
the dichotomy of  coercion/consent, civil society/state. But the meaning of  “political” as 
in political society is not clear compared to the meaning of  the political in general. For 
instance, according to Anderson’s interpretation, Gramsci’s second model intends the 
state by political society and state apparatus by the state27. If  this is the case, what is the 
specificity of political society compared with that of civil society (the domain of  the 
political designated by civil society)? The meanings of  political society, civil society, 
hegemony, and the state remain unclear in the second model. Or the issue of the level 
of  analysis/abstraction arises with regard to the distinction between civil society and 
political society. This can be made clear by comparing it with Althusser’s concept of  
ideological state apparatuses. Althusser’s theorization of  ideological apparatuses serves 
to clarify what remains latent but underdeveloped in Gramsci’s formulation. Althusser’s 
concept of  the state apparatuses comes closer to Gramsci’s concepts of  hegemonic 
apparatuses and the integral state in that it addresses the state in terms of  apparatus as 
well: the materiality of  institutions. However, what distinguishes Althusser’s concept of  
apparatus from Gramsci is that Althusser categorizes the state apparatuses by how they 
function. Althusser’s state apparatuses work in two ways (not defined by the terrain): the 
ideological state apparatuses function by ideology, while the repressive ideological state 
apparatuses function by violence 28. So, two different modes (or attributes in the 
Spinozist sense) of  the state apparatus define (or more precisely, mediate) the ‘political’, 
which is designed to account for a mechanism of  the state (or superstructure) not as a 
simple reflection of  the economic formation, i.e., the materiality/causality denoted by 
the problematic of  the mode of  production, and to avoid the conflation of  the political 
and the state or an improper distinction between civil and political: civil society is already 
political society. To wit, Althusser’s theorization of  ideology, based upon the materiality 
of ideology, deals with two different modes of  defining the political, instead of  dividing 
“private/civil” and “public”: “ideological” is more important than the “state” in 
                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 67.  
27 P. Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, cit., p. 10. 
28 Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, trans. by B. Brewster, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1971, pp. 
144-145. 
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Althusser’s conception of  the ideological state apparatuses (in that it accounts for the 
intrinsic dynamic of  the apparatuses), and the “state” denotes the superstructural 
domain/mechanism existing/operating independently of  the problematic of  the mode 
of  production. 
 
Gramsci’s second model of  hegemony and its relation to the state  
The “political” 
designated by 
superstructural level 
Civil society → Hegemony 
State 
↗ 
→ 
Coercion + Hegemony29 
 
Gramsci’s third model of  hegemony and its relations to the state 
The “political” 
designated by 
superstructural level 
State as an apparatus 
(Integral state) 
→ 
Consent 
Coercion 
 
 
3. Hegemony and Ideology  
 
Gramsci’s concept of  the integral state cancels off  the distinction between state 
and civil society and subsumes hegemony and coercion as its internal functions, and 
thereby comes closer to Althusser’s formulation of  the state apparatuses. For Gramsci, 
the concept of  the integral state is initially an attempt to delineate the specific efficacy of  
the bourgeois state as both a social and a political relation, but it can be seen as a general 
concept to account for the general mechanism of superstructure. In this formulation of  
the integral state, which is the complex system of  the dictatorship + hegemony30, the 
concept of  civil society as a distinct entity disappears, and thus hegemony appears as the 
function of  the state. But hegemony is not equated with the state itself  insofar as the 
state includes not merely the governmental apparatus, but also the “private” apparatus 
of  hegemony or civil society31. This implies that Gramsci’s later formulation (of  the 
integral state) clarifies what remains unclear or underdeveloped rather than resulting in 
blurring of  the boundaries of  the state and civil society: the introduction of  the concept 
of  the integral state, which posits the state as an apparatus, paves the way to think of  the 
political designated by the singular mechanism of  the superstructure without the 
confusion of  the political and the state.   
Until now we have attempted to read Gramsci as a theorist of  the integral state 
following the interpretations of  Buci-Glucksmann and Thomas. In their interpretations, 
                                                 
29 With regard to the second model, Anderson points out that hegemony and coercion are unevenly 
distributed between the state and civil society – “There is always a structural asymmetry in the 
distribution of  the consensual and coercive functions of  this power. Ideology [hegemony] is shared 
between civil society and the State: violence pertains to the State alone. In other words, the State enters 
twice over into any equation between the two”. P. Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci, cit., p. 32. 
30 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, cit., p. 239. 
31 “By the State should be understood not merely the governmental apparatus, but also the “private” 
apparatus of  hegemony or civil society” (ibid., p. 261). 
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Gramsci is not a theorist of  hegemony but of  the integral state, which grasps hegemony 
in terms of  the state apparatus. From this perspective, Thomas’s interpretation points 
out that Gramsci does not so much “expand” the concept of  the state, as rebels against 
its instrumental limitation by neo-Kantianism and return to its originally “expansive” 
formulations in Hegel and Marx32. Frosini also points out that Gramsci’s formulation of  
the integral state breaks with the instrumental conception of  the state to the extent that 
it addresses it in terms of  apparatus33. However, here we need to ask if  we can really find 
in Gramsci a strict sense of  the material mechanism (materiality) of  hegemony. Laclau 
and Mouffe read the materiality of  ideology from Gramsci: 
 
[in Gramsci], ideology is not identified with a “system of  ideas” or with “false consciousness” 
of  social agents; it is instead an organic and relational whole, embodied in institutions and apparatuses, 
which welds together a historical bloc around a number of  basic articulatory principles. This precludes 
the possibility of  a “superstructuralist” reading of  the ideological. In fact, through the concept of  
historical bloc and of  ideology as organic cement, a new totalizing category takes us beyond the old 
base/superstructure distinction34.  
 
Here Laclau and Mouffe attribute the materiality of  ideology to Gramsci, but it 
should be noted that Gramsci’s hegemonic apparatuses are not the same as ideological 
apparatuses. As mentioned above, it is possible to find the materiality of  institutions in 
Gramsci, but not that of  ideology. What matters here is to find the mechanism of  how 
consent is achieved. What remains constant through Gramsci’s theoretical modifications 
of  hegemony is the concept of  hegemony as consent. Whether it is related to the state 
or civil society, the core of Gramsci’s theory of  hegemony lies in thinking how consent 
is made or reached through hegemonic apparatuses. However, the notion of  consent is 
not easily compatible with that of  apparatus; consent is in fact a result or objective, not 
the mechanism itself. Or the idea of  consent, in a sense, designates the terrain but 
presupposes its effect in advance. So, one may ask whether the concept of  consent sits 
well with that of  apparatus or ideology.  
To the extent that the theory of  hegemony is based upon the idea of  consent, it 
leads to an instrumentalist understanding of  the state, and, at more fundamental level, 
would surreptitiously revive the old notion of  an autonomous subject (of  history). The 
notion of  consent entails problems in that it presupposes the existence of  subject before 
the process. On the one hand, it implies the prior existence of  economic classes who 
attempt to persuade the opposite class to maintain its domination. If  this is the case, it 
revives economism in a paradoxical way. On the other, it remains to denote the 
effectivity of  superstructure, i.e., hegemonic apparatuses, but does not account for how 
it contributes to the formation of  class consciousness insofar as it restricts itself  to the 
conscious act of  consent. In this sense, the concept of  hegemony replaces its dynamics 
with the concept of  consent. So Althusser writes: 
 
[Gramsci’s] term is “hegemonic apparatus”. This leaves a question hanging in midair: what 
                                                 
32 P. D. Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, cit., p. 139. 
33 F. Frosini, “Beyond the Crisis of  Marxism: Gramsci’s Contested Legacy”, cit.,  p. 668. 
34 E. Laclau, Ch. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, cit., p. 67. 
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produces, in Gramsci’s apparatuses, Gramsci’s hegemony-effect? Gramsci, in sum, defines his 
apparatuses in terms of  their effect or result, hegemony […] He has civil society, which […] comprises the 
whole set of  “hegemonic apparatuses”; we do not know that what they run on35. 
 
In order to make Gramsci’s theory of  hegemony meaningful, it is necessary to 
account for how consent is made through hegemonic apparatuses rather than regarding 
it as given. Probably we can ask whether Gramsci’s strategic view of  how alternative 
organization will appear within capitalism forces him to relate hegemony to the 
conception of  consent and thus bypass its intrinsic mechanism (the opposite case can be 
found in Althusser’s theory of  ideology; its main focus is to find the mechanism of  the 
formation of  the subject, and thereby it invites the criticism of functionalism). On the 
difference between Althusser’s ideology and Gramsci’s hegemony, Montag explains that 
the former “contain[s ideology] within an apparatus, fully material and external to the 
mind of  the individual, not only rendered the idea of consent meaningless but made 
visible the way in which the very notion of  consent is inextricably bound up with the 
forms of  subjection characteristic of  capitalist societies” 36 . Montag also adds an 
important point that it is not possible to detach civil society from the act of  violence , 
and thus rejects the dualism inherent in Gramsci’s theory of  hegemony  (differently put, 
economic exploitation can be also violent though it is not mediated by violence – 
‘structural violence’):  
 
If  we take seriously Althusser’s statement that “we think with our bodies”, then we can no 
longer understand the distinction between violence and ideology as a distinction between the external 
and the internal, between the domination exercised on bodies and the domination exercised on minds 37. 
 
Montag’s analysis shows that though these two great theorists share the 
conception of  the materiality of  institutions, they draw upon the totally different 
mechanisms. Thus understood, Althusser’s concept of  ideological state apparatus 
clarifies what remains underdeveloped in Gramsci’s theory of  hegemonic apparatus in 
that the former adds an inner mechanism to the latter: the mechanism of  interpellation. 
This is not to say that Althusser is greater than Gramsci, but, as Balibar points out, the 
former’s coming a generation later and in a different political and cultural conjunctures 
allows him to gain a more lucid philosophical aspect of  the questions of  the state and 
hegemony (or ideology)38. Althusser’s theory of  ideology is more lucid in thinking the 
materiality of  ideology than Gramsci’s, but has some theoretical weaknesses as well; 
particularly it privileges a specific model of  subjectivation, which Balibar and Butler calls 
the model of  inner voice39. Here we are not going to analyze in details how Althusser 
theorizes the mechanism of  ideological formation, but show how his later concept of  
topography displaces the traditional distinction of  base and superstructure, and reveals a 
                                                 
35 L. Althusser, Philosophy of  the Encounter. Later Writings 1978-1987, cit., pp. 138-140. 
36 W. Montag, Althusser and his Contemporaries, Durham, Duke University Press, 2013, p. 145. 
37 Ibid., p. 158. 
38 E. Balibar, “Structural Causality, Overdetermination, and Antagonism”, in Postmodern Materialism and 
the Future of  Marxist Theory, Wesleyan University Press, p. 111. 
39 J. Butler, Excitable Speech, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 32. 
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theoretical tension in his own formulation of  ideology and historical materialism. The 
reformulation of  historical materialism based upon the concept of  (and the materialism 
of) topography plays a central role in Althusser’s self-criticism, and interestingly it is 
Gramsci who first paid attention to it as an inner mechanism of  hegemony: “the level of  
ideologies that men become conscious of  conflicts in the world of  economy”40. So it is 
worth comparing how it is defined in them. This comparison will reveal Althusser’s 
limitation and provide a reference point in reformulating the idea of  overdetermination.    
 
 
4. Topography: Ideology and Communication  
 
In order to properly understand the formulation of  ideology in Althusser’s work, 
it is necessary to focus on Althusser’s work in 1976-77, which is characterized by his 
formulation of  topography. Many commentators regard the work from this period as a 
voluntarist reinterpretation of  historical materialism or a destructive retreat, but in my 
view these works are important in accounting for and realizing Althusser’s concept of  
ideology and thus in concretizing the conception of  overdetermination. 
Althusser always considers that theory is an intervention in conjuncture, but the 
effects should be sought in its power of  objective analysis (this created a fission between 
him and his Maoist pupils in May 1968, e.g. Rancière). However, in his later formulation 
of  rupture, he stresses its political effect. In short, the works from 1976-77 prioritize 
conjectural intervention of  theory and its effect over the objective analysis of  theory. In 
Transformation of  Philosophy (1976) and Marxism Today (1977), for instance, Althusser 
derived a different conception of  topography from Marx’s Preface to the 1859 
Contribution in order to explain the reality and conditions of  the formation/function of  
theory. Althusser argued that “ideas can become active only in and through ideological 
forms”41: Althusser comes closer to Gramsci when he mentions that theory becomes 
active when it becomes an ideology, and it seems to mark a serious break with his earlier 
formulation of  epistemological rupture. As is well known, the epistemological r upture 
implies that sciences are formed by breaking with ideologies. In For Marx, Althusser 
writes that science can no more be ranged within the category superstructure than can 
language in response to Gramsci – “also science is a superstructure”42. As Frosini 
mentions, Gramsci is outlined as:    
 
the theory-practice of  hegemony, in the sense that it is theoretically aware of  the hegemonic 
character of  every ideological reality. Consequently, it inserts itself  in the ideological relation as a partial 
point of  view, as a political force that works actively in the criticism of  the dominant hegemony43.   
 
Gramsci also writes: “it should be recalled that the economy is only mainspring of  
history in the last instance […] this statement is to be related directly to the passage in 
                                                 
40 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks¸ cit., p. 162. 
41 L. Althusser, Philosophy of  the Encounter. Later Writings 1978-1987, cit., p. 48. 
42 L. Althusser, E. Balibar, Reading Capital, cit., p. 133. 
43 F. Frosini, “Beyond the Crisis of  Marxism: Gramsci’s Contested Legacy”, cit., p. 677. 
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the preface to the Critique of  Political Economy which says that it is on the level of  
ideologies that men become conscious of  conflicts in the world of  the economy”44. 
Here it seems that Gramsci comes closer to Althusser by admitting to the thesis of  the 
determination in the last instance by the economy, and Althusser’s reformulation of  
topography drifts even further away from the orthodoxy of  Marxism and even from his 
earlier formulation of  historical materialism when he argues that “ideas can become 
active only in and through ideological forms”. As mentioned, many theorists read 
destructive and fragmentary elements in Althusser’s reformulation of  topography; it is 
especially accused of  voluntarism. But in my view, this is the moment Althusser gets 
further away from Gramsci, and the conceptualization of  topography allows us 
Althusser concretize his formulation of  ideology. 
Althusser’s topography thesis should be located in the context of the materiality 
of  ideology and ideas. Roughly speaking, if  a discourse or theory is to produce effects in 
reality, it needs to materialize itself. In this context, topography denotes conditions under 
which theories become effective, rather than implying that they are the same as 
ideologies. In point of  fact, by “ideological forms”  Althusser did not mean ideological 
propaganda, moral inculcation, scientific education or religious rituals, but combined 
them with the problems of  organization in Marxism, i.e. in terms of  an apparatus. That 
is to say, the conceptualization of  topography does not simply reduce theory to political 
intervention, but takes into account the relation of  theory and reality as a condition of  
its scientificity. Here it is worth mentioning a recent development in modern physics 
very briefly, in order to compare it with Althusser’s idea of  topography and clarify the 
theoretical implication of  this concept.  
Modern physics takes into account the observation conditions as intrinsic 
condition of  its validity. Quantum mechanics considers that observation conditions are 
inherent to scientific knowledge. As mentioned above, the position and the momentum 
of  a particle cannot simultaneously be calculated with precision in quantum mechanics, 
but only one value can be precisely determined at a time: the measurement error of  the 
position of  a moving particle under experimental conditions can only be made to 
approach zero provided one accepts a measurement error of  ∞ in its momentum, and 
vice versa. This appears to weaken or alter conventional scientific standards of  
measurement. According to Cohen-Tannoudji, this does not so much deny the 
objectivity of  reality or scientific causality as recognize the conditions of observation 
that are intrinsic to the phenomena they attempt to explain. 
 
in physics today, we can no longer pretend to ignore the observation conditions […] we can no 
longer pretend to describe reality itself  directly; physicists describe […] a phenomenon as an element or a 
moment of  reality placed under observation conditions that are as well defined as possible. This 
carefully considered and expressed position does not in any way deny the existence of  a reality 
independent of  observations45. 
 
According to Cohen-Tannoudji, this does not so much deny the objectivity of  
                                                 
44 A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks¸ cit., p. 162 
45 G. Cohen-Tannoudji, Universal Constants in Physics, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1992, p. 63. 
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reality or scientific causality as recognize the conditions of  observation are intrinsic to 
the phenomena they attempt to explain. In other words, observation is not independent 
of  its objects it attempts to explain, but affects its result even in the field of  natural 
sciences. So, the relationship between observation and its objects should be taken into 
account for to properly explain them.  
The same could apply to historical materialism or socio-economic theory in 
general. As stock forecasting somehow makes the real movements of  stock prices 
deviating from it, theoretical activities of  social sciences affect the way people react. We 
can address Althusser’s concept of  topography from this perspective: the relationship 
between theory and its conditions and effects is constitutive of  its theoretical validity. 
With “topography”, Althusser addressed theories or ideas not in terms of  “principles of  
explanation of  the given whole”, but “in terms of  their possible effect in the ideological, 
and therefore political class struggle”46. So, theory forms a double relation to the social 
structure; basically, theory plays the role of  explaining society, but, at the same time, it 
creates effects on it insofar as it is a component part of  the society that it attempts to 
explain, which in turn constitutes (and proves) its theoretical validity. Accordingly, the 
measure of  Marx’s materialism “is less the materialist content of  his theory than the 
acute, practical consciousness of  the conditions, forms and limits within which these 
ideas can become active”. Based on this idea of  “the double inscription/positions of  
ideas (theories) in the topography”47, Althusser argued that “ideas can become active 
only in and through ideological forms”48. In short, a revolutionary theory does not 
suffice to explain reality, but must become an ideology, or ideological form (apparatus) 
so as to act on consciousness. This does not imply that ideologies and the sciences are 
the same, but denotes specificity of  historical materialism: its scientificity is not given but 
proved by the mass actions. Then the relation between theory and object (in this case 
mass movements) is intrinsic to its validity.  
We can also attempt to translate the conception of  topography in terms of  
communication. What is at issue here is that Althusser’s idea of  topography presupposes 
that it is not just the content of  theory but how people receive and understand the 
theory is constitutive of  its validity. Though Althusser did not directly formulate the idea 
of  communication, his formulation of  ideology implies a communicative relationship 
between historical materialism and mass movements. More precisely, Althusser’s theory 
of ideology explains the formation of  the subject or imaginary not as direct 
reflection(deformation) of  the real, but in relation to the representation of  the real. In 
other words, ideology, for Althusser, “represents the imaginary relationship of  
individuals to their real conditions of  existence […] it is not their real conditions of  
existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represents to themselves’ in ideology, but above all 
it is their relation to those conditions of  existence which is represented to them there. It 
is this relation which is at the center of  every ideology, i.e., imaginary distortion of  the 
                                                 
46 L. Althusser, Philosophy of  the Encounter. Later Writings 1978-1987, cit., p. 48. 
47 L. Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of  the Scientists , ed. by G. Elliot, London, Verso, 
1990, p. 276; L. Althusser, Philosophy of  the Encounter. Later Writings 1978-1987, cit., p. 48. 
48 Ibid., p .48, see also pp. 46-54  
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ideological representation of  the real world”49. This implies that ideology, for Althusser, 
operates mainly in the symbolic and that subjectivity is the function of  the dual 
determination of the real and the symbolic: insofar as Althusser’s conceptualization of  
ideology based upon the symbolic (the materiality of  ideology which revolves around 
the materiality of  signifiers and institutions), it contains within itself  the idea of  
communication50, not in a Habermasian sense but in terms of  the materiality of  
signifiers and institutions.  
Thus regarded, we can say that, though Althusser and Gramsci use the same 
terminology, their understanding is quite different. Althusser’s conception of  
topography remains within the matrix of  structuralism, whether it is in the form of  
ideology or communication, in that it regards the subject as an effect. Yet Gramsci still 
presupposes the autonomy of  the subject: there is an unmediated relationship between 
politics and subject in Gramsci’s formulation of  hegemony, and politics runs exclusively 
on the autonomy of the subject. Gramsci’s hegemony apparently has the potential to 
think the materiality of  ideology, and his interest on language can be located within the 
materiality of  signifiers, but when he links the theory of  hegemony to “consent” , it 
surreptitiously revives the idea of  the autonomy of  the subject. On the other hand, 
subjectivity, for Althusser, is the effect of  the symbolic: Althusser’s theory of  ideology 
presupposes the materiality of  ideology based upon the materiality of  signifiers. Here it 
is worth mentioning in passing Balibar’s reading of  Spinoza. Differently from Deleuze’s 
vitalist interpretation of Spinoza, Balibar grasps Spinoza’s theory as the theory of  
communication: Spinoza explains individuality in terms of  the function of  
communication. So, Spinoza, according to Balibar, posits the communication structure 
of  society as a universal constant/constraint of  society/history. So what Balibar 
attempts to do is to generalize Marxism51, which means extending the boundary of  
Marxism by articulating the framework of  the mode of  production with another 
universal frameworks (this implies the multiplicity of  universal structure, not random 
interventions of  arbitrary factors), e.g., the mode of  communication (Spinoza)52. To the 
extent that Althusser’s conception of  topography contains the elements of  
communication, we can apply Balibar’s idea of  communication to clarify what remains 
latent in it (then, we can also find a continuity between later Althusser and Balibar).  
 
 
5. A Last Classical Marxist?  
 
                                                 
49 L. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, cit., pp. 162-164.  
50 See K.D. Kang Debates on Structuralist Marxism¸ Seoul, Seo-Guang Sa, 2014, ch. 4. 
51 See E. Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, transl. by J. Swenson, New York, Routledge, 1994, “Preface” 
52 According to Balibar, “material processes are themselves (over- and under-) determined by the 
processes of  the imaginary, which have their own very effective materiality  […] the imaginary [is] the 
‘infrastructure of  the infrastructure’ itself” (E. Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, trans. by Ch. Jones, J. 
Swenson and Ch. Turner, London, Verso, 2002, p. XIII). Yves Duroux explains that, for Balibar, the 
mode of  subjectivation constitutes the second base (conditions) of  politics (Y. Duroux, Inactuel Marx: 
remarques sur me noeud politique, “Critique”, 53, 1997, n. 601-602, pp. 522-536: 528). 
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If  we admit the theoretical effectivity of  Althusser’s formulation of  topography, it 
installs a significant theoretical tension in Althusser’s project, closely related to his 
concept of  ideology. In other words, the formulation of  the materiality of  ideology 
based on this new understanding of  topography leads us to confront an important 
theoretical tension in Althusser’s oeuvre. Althusser’s theory implies that Marx’s critique 
of political economy is a kind of  politics. The truth of  politics, for Marx, lies in the 
materiality of  economic processes, i.e. the contradictions of  exploitation. Of course, 
there is no doubt that Althusser was fundamentally a Marxist philosopher in the sense 
of understanding the mode of  production as a cause of  politics. However, Althusser’s 
theory of ideology implies that Marx’s critique of  economy is not sufficient enough to 
constitute the theory of  politics, and that (the critique of) ideology is a general element 
of  politics. Using structuralist terms, the subject is determined by the mode of  
production and by the ideological formation. So, Althusser did not move directly 
towards the notion of  the autonomy of  politics in order to fill in the theoretical gap of  
political theory, but attempted to account for it by adding ideology as another “motor 
cause”(or two other scenes in Balibar’s terms) of  politics.  
 
instead of  adding a theory of  superstructure [ideology] to the existing theory of  the “structure”, 
aim[ed] at transforming the concept of  structure itself  by showing that its process of  “production” and 
“reproduction” originally depends on unconscious ideological conditions. As a consequence, the social 
formation is no longer representable in dualistic terms – a thesis that logically should lead us to 
abandon the image of  the superstructure53.  
 
So, the criticism of ideology constitutes, for Althusser, politics together with the 
criticism of  economy. The causality of  ideology based upon the materiality of  ideology 
allows us to reinterpret Althusser’s oeuvre through the concept of  overdetermination. In 
a sense, Althusser’s works of  1976-78, possibly even his whole oeuvre, are based on the 
thesis of  the materiality of  ideology and ideas, which does not seem to sit well with his 
fundamental thesis of  materialism: determination in the last instance by the economy. If  
ideology has its own materiality and contributes to change in the structure, this does not 
seem to be easily compatible with the thesis of determination in the last instance by the 
economy (in fact, the thesis of  determination in the last instance by the economy does 
not move in harmony with his anti-teleological account of  history and with his 
theoretical formulation of  overdetermination insofar as it conceives of  the economy as 
the ultimate cause of  historical development). That is, a theoretical tension between 
overdetermination and determination in the last instance cuts across Althusser’s wo rk, 
and the contradictory relation between these two terms remained in the margins starting 
in the early sixties: “the lonely hour of  the last instance never comes”. Now the later 
formulation of  topography, which posits the  causality/materiality of  ideology, brings 
this tension to the fore, and going beyond Althusser, we can reconstruct Althusser’s 
project of  recasting historical materialism with the concept of  overdetermination. In 
other words, Althusser’s entire oeuvre proposes, if  implicitly, the dual determination of  
                                                 
53 E. Balibar, “Non-contemporaneity of  Althusser”, in E. Ann Kaplan, M. Sprinker (eds.), The 
Althusserian Legacy, London, Verso, 1993, p. 8. 
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the mode of  production and ideology. 
We can interpret this situation from two opposite perspectives. Firstly, Althusser 
simply might not be aware of  this theoretical tension. If  this is the case, what he was 
doing resists what he was saying. In other word, Althusser actually deconstructed the 
thesis of  determination in the last instance by the economy, but did not recognize its 
implication. Secondly, Althusser might fully recognize the implication of  his work, but 
strategically refrained from announcing it. In fact, it is not difficult to read the strategy 
of “theoretical detour” in Althusser’s work. If  the latter is the case, we can read how 
conjunctures affect the theory itself  from this internal tension in Althusser’s theoretical 
position: self-censorship or strategy of  theoretical detour as Spinoza did with the notion 
of  God. 
Whatever the case is, what we can find in Althusser’s theory is a shift from 
classical Marxism to a broad reconfiguration of  Marxism (historical materialism) which 
proposes another motor cause of  society. Though sticking to the idea of  the 
determination in the last instance by the economy, he actually deconstructs Marxism, 
and extends its scope. As regards Althusser’s project in general, Gregory Elliott writes 
that Althusser’s Marxism gives momentum to facilitate the development of  
postmodernism and post-structuralism, which undermines the theoretical effectivity of  
Marxism by attacking the determination in the last instance by the economy; according 
to Elliott, Althusser’s work also facilitates the eclipse of  Althusserian project as well. In 
my view, it is not fair to ascribe the eclipse of  Marxism to Althusser (in that Althusser 
also has positive elements to develop it). Rather, it would be more reasonable to find 
causes for the decline of  Marxism (as a theory) in the decline of  the working class 
movements, and in the efficient counterattack of  the capitalist, as is well indicated by the 
emergence of neo-liberalism. In order to properly assess the theoretical/political 
influence of  post-theories, and its influence on and by Althusser’s theory, more careful 
studies need to be followed. But, one thing to note is that the eclipse of  Marxism, under 
the influence of  neo-liberalism and post-modernism, produces a positive conjunctural 
effect on Marxism in a paradoxical way. When Althusser proposed “overdetermination” 
as a truly Marxist concept, it was criticized as pluralism. Now with the eclipse of  
orthodox Marxism, and of  the Stalinist parties (e.g. PCF), the idea of  overdetermination 
is relatively free from the criticism of  pluralism. In addition, escaping from the 
theoretical and political influence of  post-theories, we can say that overall changes 
within conjuctures allow us to rethink the meaning of  overdetermination. Isn’t Lenin’s 
idea of  “concrete analysis of  concrete situations” fundamentally pluralistic? Are the 
sciences in general pluralist? Two points are worth mentioning. First of  all, the re-
conceptualization of  topography allows, as mentioned above, us to readdress the 
problematic of  ideology by proposing the possibility to read it into the conception of  
the mode of  communication. At least it has the potential to concretize the problematic 
of  ideology by accounting for the relationship between the masses and historical 
materialism. Secondly, it also forces us to think the meaning of  overdetermination by 
proposing another universal mechanisms which concretize the problematic of  
overdetermination. On this point, Balibar writes:  
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The class struggle can and must be understood as a determining structure affecting all social 
practices, without however being the only one. Or, to put it more clearly, it is precisely to the extent that 
it affects all practices that it necessarily interferes with the universality of  other structures. Universality 
here is not synonymous with unicity, any more than overdetermination is the same as indeterminacy54. 
 
From a similar perspective, it is possible to see, as Yoon suggests, class 
exploitation as a “universal constant”, which in some sense coincides with Bhaskar’s 
formulation of  generative mechanism55. According to Yoon, in the same way that 
universal constants in physics such as G (Newton’s constant), k (Boltzmann’s constant), c 
(Einstein’s constant – the speed of  light), and h (Planck’s constant) express, delimit and 
explain universal elements of  the world, and condition (the formulation of) the universal 
laws in physics, class exploitation is a universal aspect of  society, and conditions the 
development of  it. That is, class exploitation is a universal and constant constraint of  
society, and thus acts as a necessary condition of  the development of  society, while not 
being the only one. So we can ask whether overdetermination distinguishes itself  from 
pluralism by insisting the multiplicity of  universal constants: overdetermination 
presupposes the coexistence and constant functioning of universal elements, not 
random determination of  arbitrary elements. More broadly, we need to explore what can 
be the Marxist concept of  historical causality once again, and along with Althusser, we 
can test “overdetermination” as a demarcation line (or at least as reference point) 
between materialism and idealism56 (economy as an universal constraint, not as the final 
cause). 
 
 
6. Italian Connection: search for an alternative to the party apparatus 
 
The concept of  topography, insofar as it denotes the theoretical necessity to deal 
with the independent mechanism of  the superstructure, whether it is related to 
Gramsci’s hegemonic apparatus(integral state) or Althusser’s ideological state apparatus, 
raises, in the end, the question of  how Marxist ideas can be materialized in concrete 
forms. There is no doubt that a new form of  political organization or apparatus will 
appear as a result of  complex economic, cultural, and political interactions, and history 
seems to prove the poverty of  our imagination at this point. In some sense, Althusser’s 
criticism of  the PCF serves as a negative index to designate the difficulty of  maintaining 
and renewing the vitality of communist movement. However, we still need to ask where 
we should find a clue to make a new start. Althusser’s criticism of  the PCF, and 
Gramsci’s theory of  the state can be a good reference point to think about it. 
                                                 
54 E. Balibar, I. Wallerstein, Race Nation Class: Ambiguous Identities, trans. (of  E. Balibar) by Ch. Turner, 
London, Verso, 1991, p. 181. 
55 S. Yoon Outlines of  Generalized Marxism, Seoul, Gong-Gam, 2006, pp. 163-175; A. Collier, Scientific 
Realism and Socialist Thought, Brighton, Harvester, 1988, pp. 66-70; R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of  Science, 
London, Verso, 1975. 
56 K. D. Kang, Debates on Structuralist Marxism¸ cit., 229-246. 
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Although nominally loyal to the international communist movement and a long-
standing member of  its French organization, the PCF, Althusser’s thinking had long 
been at odds with communist orthodoxy. The PCF could not simply ignore Althusser’s 
theoretical strategy of a “return to Marx” , but sought to live with it and with him. 
Consequently, an uneasy but essentially peaceful relationship between them was 
maintained for a long time. However, the 22nd Congress of  the PCF brought this 
contradictory relation to an end. It was at this Congress that the PCF renounced the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. Althusser denounced the party’s abandonment of  it 
reminding the party that “the ‘abandonment’ of  a theoretical concept  […] cannot be the 
object of  a political decision”57. The tone and content of  criticism became more fierce 
and aggressive in What Must Change in the Party. The PCF leadership, according to 
Althusser, reproduced the parliamentary and military aspects of  the party in its structure 
and mode of  functioning; the party had come to depend on the electoral system which 
produced the hierarchy of  officials; rank-and-file militants were enclosed in upward-
moving traffic, which filtered the rank-and-file contribution, and had no contacts with 
militants from other cells; everything was done from above, and, consequently, rank-and-
file members were alienated from the party’s decision making process. For Althusser, the 
same problem can be seen in Party’s relationship to the masses. The masses must be at 
the core of  a revolutionary party’s political practices, and thus its relationship to the 
masses is the central political relationship. Nonetheless, the PCF leadership had a “deep -
rooted, tenacious and inveterate distrust of  the masses”58, and viewed them as the object 
of  manipulation to win political power. The overall result was that the PCF’s political 
line and functions separated the masses from the party; “the Party appears as a fortress”. 
Althusser here flags some important points in thinking the alter-apparatus of  a 
communist movement, if  not providing a direct answer to the question of  concrete 
forms. So taking some distance from Althusser, we can try to reconstruct a platform on 
which to build up a new path for communist movements, and in order to answer it, we 
need to ask: how can we interpret Althusser’s belated criticism of the PCF in relation to 
the history of  the communist movements? To the extent that Althusser’s criticism was 
not just towards its leadership, but also towards its structure and functions, we can 
regard it as a fundamental criticism towards the existing party form as a revolutionary 
organization. More precisely, it can be seen as a criticism toward the vanguard party as a 
revolutionary form of  political organization. This is not to say that the Leninist 
conception of  the vanguard party is historically wrong or meaningless, but to say that 
the vanguard form is no longer valid as an effective alternative in communist movements. 
If  this is the case, we can produce a positive effect from Althusser’s critique in thinking 
alternative form of  politics. In short, Althusser’s criticism of  the communist party 
reminds us of  an underground current in the history of  the modern communist 
movement: council communism. Apparently, Althusser was not a council communist 
and he did not mention it as an alternative. So, at a first glimpse, it seems arbitrary to 
relate Althusser’s criticism to council communism, but, in addition to the fact that 
                                                 
57 L. Althusser, On the Twenty-Second Congress of  the French Communist Party, “New Left Review”, 1977, 
n.104, pp.3-22: 10.. 
58 L. Althusser, What Must Change in the Party, “New Left Review”, 1978, n.109, pp.19-45: 43.  
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Althusser stressed workers’ active participation in the political organization, looking at 
the conjuncture in which Althusser was engaged with regard to the crisis of  Marxism 
would provide the possibility to link Althusser to the tradition of  council communism. 
In the late 1970s, Althusser showed more interest in the internal problems of  the PCI 
(or more accurately the left faction within the PCI), and put some hope on it. It was 
mainly because the rift between Althusser and the PCF got deepened, and their 
relationship would soon move past the point of  no return due to his criticism of  the 
party. But it can be conjectured that the encounter between Althusser and the left faction 
within the PCI was not accidental or arbitrary considering they shared some theoretical 
background.    
As mentioned above, confronted by the general depression in the international 
and domestic communist movements in the mid 1970s, Althusser declared the crisis of  
Marxism in a conference at Venice (1977) organized by Il Manifesto (a far-Left group 
expelled by the PCI in 1969) under the title Power & Opposition in post-revolutionary societies, 
and there was a follow-up interview with Rossana Rossanda59, in which Althusser also 
pointed out that Marxism was a limited theory. His comments about the problems of  
political organization and the PCI’s political strategies (e.g., on the Bobbio debate and 
the debate between Amato-Ingrao-de Giovanni) in the conference presentation and in 
the interview provoked responses from the theorists in the PCI. In his presentation on 
the crisis of  Marxism, and in the interview with Rossanda, Althusser exhibited an 
interest in Bruno Trentin’s60 and Pietro Ingrao’s61 theoretical and political ideas. Both 
addressed organizational questions, i.e., the relations between party and trade un ions, 
from the perspective of  the workers’ council62. At the Venice conference, Trentin raised 
the problem of  hierarchy between the parties and trade unions. According to him, the 
current crisis of  the communist movements was closely involved with the authoritative 
subordination of  the trade unions by the parties: in 1972, Trentin attempted to reform 
the CGIL classifying council unions one of  the main protagonists of  “Hot Autumn” .  
So, what was crucial in the communist movements was to restore the role of  trade 
unions as “autonomous and conflictive organizations”63. That is to say, trade unions 
needed to reunify economics and politics in the factories and workshops “while 
remaining ‘partial’ and not crystallizing into totalizing institutions”64 in the construction 
of a collective synthesis. Trentin’s criticism of  the relationship between party and trade 
union corresponded to Althusser’s position on the same question in that both viewed 
                                                 
59 L. Althusser, Entretien, “Dialectiques”, 1978, n. 23, pp. 5-12. 
60 L. Althusser, The Crisis of Marxism, cit., p. 216. 
61 L. Althusser, Entretien, cit., pp. 10-11. 
62  On Council Communism, see Marcel van der Linden, On Council Communism, “Historical 
Materialism”, 12, 2004, n. 4, pp. 27-50; the Dutch Group of  International Communists (GIK), The 
Origins of  the Movement for Workers’ Councils in Germany, http://libcom.org/library/origins-movement-
workers-councils, 1994; P. Rachleff, Marxism and Council Communism: The Foundation for Revolutionary 
Theory for Modern Society, Brooklyn, Revisionist Press, 1976; P. Bourrinet, La Gauche communiste germano-
hollandaise: Des origines à 1968, http://www.left-dsl.nl, 1999. 
63 B. Trentin, “Only Conflictive Democracy Can Guarantee Liberty, East and West”, in L. Althusser et 
al., Power & Opposition in Post-Revolutionary Societies, London, Ink Links, London, 1979, pp. 196-206. 
64 Ibid., p. 205 
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the democratic relations (within the party) between leadership and membership, and 
between the party and the other mass organizations such as labor unions as a crucial 
issue in revitalizing the communist movements. For instance, in On the Twenty-Second 
Congress of  the French Communist Party, Althusser emphasized a necessity to overcome 
hierarchical relations between the party and workers while retaining the problematic of  
the dictatorship of  the proletariat (in so doing, Althusser brought to the fore a core 
problem in the problematic of  the dictatorship of  the proletariat, i.e. the dilemma of  
“democratic centralism” and the “right to form factions”). So, we can translate 
Althusser’s criticism through the prism of  council communism, though Althusser did 
not refer to council communism.  
Yet, it should be noted that the differences between them were also obvious. The 
criticism of Althusser from the PCI was generally targeted on his objection to the idea of 
the use of the state as a tool of transition. From Althusser’s side, the Ingrao -Left’s 
attempt to articulate the mass movements with the state was seen putting too much 
emphasis on the role of the state. In short, Althusser was opposed to the notion of “a 
party of government” (‘democratization and revolutionization of the state from within’), 
and defended the notion of a revolutionary party outside the state. Althusser’s central 
argument was to criticize the idea of Eurocommunism, even though he did not object to 
the “possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism”65. That is to say, Althusser had a 
skeptical view about the idea of ‘democratizing and revolutionizing the state from 
within’.  
This last point forces us to see a weak point in Althusser’s understanding of the 
state, and from this we can attempt to hazard an answer as regards the problem of 
alternative apparatus, which opens a theoretical space in which Gramsci becomes 
meaningful. Agreeing with Althusser’s objection against the notion of “a party of 
government”, we can ask if it is possible to think a revolution outside the state. On this 
point, Balibar writes that “the existence of a social movement “outside the State” is a 
contradiction in terms”, which drove him to part company with Althusser66(Balibar 
might say that there is no insurrectional politics, i.e. revolution, without a constitutional 
politics or revolution becomes universal in the form of domination – an articulation of 
the insurrectional politics and the constitutional politics)67. In a sense, Althusser’s 
conception of overdetermination (and his notion of structure)  does not sit well with a 
social/communist movement outside the state in that it implies that reproduction and 
transition are not separable, but rather the different sides of the same process: in 
particular, the notion of underdetermination implies, according to Althusser, “a 
threshold of determination which, if it is not crossed, causes revolutions to miscarry, 
revolutionary movements to stagnate or disappear, and imperialism to rot while still 
developing, etc.” 68This idea of underdetermination implies that the moment of the 
current conjuncture is nothing other than the moment of determination whether or not 
it crosses a revolutionary threshold, and that the structure is the succession of 
                                                 
65 L. Althusser, On the Twenty-Second Congress of  the French Communist Party, cit., p. 13. 
66 E. Balibar, The Infinite Contradiction, “Yale French Studies”, 1995, n. 88, pp. 142-164: 157. 
67 E. Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, cit., p. 51.  
68 L. Althusser, Essays in Self-Criticism, translated by G. Lock, London, New Left Books, 1976, p. 187. 
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continuous conjunctural determinations. So, Balibar comments that “two reciprocal 
points of view of overdetermination and underdetermination”, for Althusser, “come into 
play at the same time”69. As such, the concept of overdetermination is not opposite to 
the Gramscian notion of “war of position”, but has some theoretical space in it to 
account for or subsume it. Or Gramsci’s notion of revolution as a long worldwide 
process which requires a protracted labor of capturing fortresses and earthworks and 
constructing a historic bloc of various classes can be reinterpreted from the perspective 
of overdetermination/underdetermination. 
Then we can place Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in Althusser’s framework – 
the question of how we are going to articulate Althusser’s critique of the PCF with 
Gramsci’s idea of a social change within capitalism (without falling into the trap of 
“apparatus of government or party of government”). Or we can ask where to find an 
alternative form of political organization, one not based upon the party apparatus or 
vanguard party. In this framework, Althusser’s criticism of the PCF from the perspective 
of council communism confronts Gramsci’s theory of political organization in two 
different sides: Bolshevism (vanguard party) and (the left-wing) Euro-communism (the 
Ingrao-Left). It was well known that not just the Russian Revolution (Revolution against 
Karl Marx’s Capital) but the factory council in Turin in 1920 had a significant impact on 
Gramsci’s development of the theory of hegemony. The Italian factory occupation in 
Turin, which was one of the first instances of a factory being seized by workers, gave 
rise for the first time to the idea that the workers could make the revolution not by 
bringing production to a halt (the general strike) but rather by taking charge of it 
themselves70, and Gramsci, as Buci-Glucksmann points out, regards the structure of 
councils as “essentially an attempt to create the elements of a dual power, to construct, 
starting from the masses, the foundations for a seizure of power that would shatter the 
existing state”71. According to Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci’s councilism is an important 
factor to distinguish Gramsci from Bordiga, whom he once shared criticism against the 
strategy of class alliance (the “United Front”) with72. 
Then was Gramsci a council communist? In this respect, Gramsci was a 
controversial figure who reflects conflicts between Bolshevism and council communism. 
Though inspired by the factory council in Turin, Gramsci, under the influence of the 
Russian leadership, downplayed the spontaneism of workers’ council against “voluntary 
associations” of the union and the party, and highlighted the party’s leading role in the 
formation of class consciousness and the education of the masses. Gramsci’s position 
was generally in line with Lenin’s idea of the vanguard party. For Lenin, the hegemony 
of the proletariat was “unthinkable without the leading function of the vanguard party, 
in Soviet Russian conditions, and practically identical with the leadership of the 
Bolshevik Party”73, and Gramsci’s formulation of hegemony largely coincided with the 
                                                 
69 E. Balibar, “Structural Causality, Overdetermination, and Antagonism”, cit., p. 115. 
70 V. Wallis, “Workers’ Control and Revolution”, in Ours to Master and to Own: Workers’ Control from the 
Commune to the Present, ed. by D. Azzellini and I. Ness, Chicago, Haymarket, 2011, pp. 10-31. 
71 Ch. Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, cit., p. 165. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid., p. 180. 
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Leninist conception of hegemony and the party. Some theorists74 including Anderson 
and Buci-Glucksmann make this point clear: “the transition from war of movement to 
war of position was certainly by no means limited to a mere geographical distinction”75, 
and Anderson finds the roots of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony in the Bolshevik 
experience rather than in the experience of the factory councils. Gramsci gradually 
recognized the limits of council communism broadly in support of the idea of vanguard 
party. For Gramsci, the strategy of factory councils is related to the imperialist phase of 
the historical evolution of the bourgeois class where industrial power is divorced from 
the factory and concentrated in a trust, a monopoly, a bank, the State bureaucracy76, but 
seems unrealistic as form of alternative organization in the west77; it fails to exercise its 
meaning, entrenched by strong and stable hegemonic apparatuses. On this point, 
Althusser comments: 
 
What present itself, in Gramsci, as a “theory of the state” [...] [is] more closely akin to a political 
examination of the “nature” of the “composition” or internal arrangement [dispositive] of the states of the day, undertaken 
with a view to defining a political strategy for the workers’ movement after all hope that the schema of 1917 would 
be repeated had faded, and after these states had been marked by the transformation inflicted on them 
by the development of imperialism78. 
 
If Gramsci’s core with regard to the theory of communist organization is the 
vanguard party rather than council communism , Gramsci is not free from Althusser’s 
criticism of the PCF (as is Althusser himself), though his formulation of hegemony casts 
some light on the implication of overdetermination. As mentioned above, this is not 
simply to say that his political practice is historically wrong, but to ask if his theory can 
be a practical index to find a breakthrough in the current conjuncture. Or we can ask at a 
more fundamental level if Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, which presupposes a gradual 
process of revolution, particularly in relation to the developed form of capitalism, may 
not be intrinsically compatible with the vanguard party in opposition to his own 
understanding of the party and revolution79. So, my last working hypothesis here is to 
reinterpret Gramsci’s theory of hegemony/state (and Althusser’s criticism of the PCF) 
through the prism of social movement. Communist movements in the 21st century, 
unlike the early 20th century, may have to take the form of social movements rather than 
the vanguard party, and it may better realize what is latent in Gramsci’s theory. If the 
vanguard party does not fit the bill as a revolutionary organization, and, at the same time, 
if the communist movement should go beyond “a party of government”, communism as 
a social movement comes into view as a realistic alternative. Yet the discussion of 
council communism and social movement unionism is not to idealize them as the 
                                                 
74 See also F. Rosengarten, The Revolutionary Marxism of  Antonio Gramsci , Leiden, Brill, 2014, ch. 1. 
75 Ch. Buci-Glucksmann, Gramsci and the State, cit., p. 187. 
76 Ibid., p. 138. 
77 It should be also noted that Gramsci shared left-opposition with Bordiga, who refused to accept class 
alliance with social-democrats, but in the end broke with him.  
78 L. Althusser, Philosophy of  the Encounter. Later Writings 1978-1987, cit., p. 141. 
79 According to Laclau and Mouffe, “if  in Leninism there was a militarization of  politics, in Gramsci 
there is a demilitarization of  war” (E. Laclau, Ch. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, cit., p. 70). 
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contemporary form of communism, but to stress the necessity to reconstitute Marxist 
theory based upon existing references in the conjunctures. In the current conjuncture in 
which the Marxist movement remains marginal for some reasons, it would be helpful to 
reread the Marxist theory based upon the really existing movement instead of simply 
applying it to the conjunctures. Yet this is more than just saying that we need to find 
empirical evidence of viable communism; on a theoretical level, some form of SMU, .e.g. 
Waterman’s idea of SMU, has some affinity with Althusser’s theory in general, and also 
provides some point with which to reinterpret Gramsci. Instead of conclusion, therefore, 
I would like to propose some points of contact between Althusser and SMU, and 
Gramsci and SMU for more future discussion.  
 
 
7. Council Communism, Social Movement and Althusser  
 
Firstly, SMU addresses communism/communist movement in terms of social 
movement and thus poses the masses as subject of this movement. The concept of 
social movement unionism corresponds to some degree to Althusser’s conception of 
overdetermination in the sense that it allows for a multiplicity of contradictions. For 
instance, Peter Waterman’s social movement unionism grasps the problem of labor and 
production (workers’ control) as a core problem and at the same time attempts to get 
over the early form of factory councils by arguing for the necessity to articulate with 
other movements closely related to other universal constraints of society and history 
such as sexual differences and natural environment. So, it broadly accepts a multiplicity 
of contradictions of global space, subjects and movements. 
Secondly, rather than rejecting a mechanistic distinction of reform within 
capitalism and transformation beyond capitalism, it insists on the interrelation of 1) a 
radical transformation of capitalism in the sense of imaginable global communities and 2) 
the immediate necessity of civilizing a capitalist world order that threatens not so much 
that order itself as the existence of the human species80. This somewhat resonates with 
Gramsci’s idea of changes within capitalism or the state. Or it may be possible to 
reinterpret Gramsci’s war of position/passive revolution with this concept rather than 
with the vanguard party (relating hegemony to social movement). Without falling into 
the trap of reformism, this articulates the long term goals of communism with short-
term strategies of transforming capitalism.  
Thirdly, Waterman’s social movement unionism discloses and clarifies what 
remains underdeveloped in Althusser’s theory of ideology. Though Althusser’s theory of 
ideology/topography implies the effectivity of ideology, i.e., ideological state apparatuses, 
based upon the materiality of the symbolic, Althusser does not properly recognize the 
effectivity of ideology from a practical point of view. He has a tendency to disregard the 
strategic necessity to work on the elaboration of the symbolic. For Althusser, liberty and 
equality are just bourgeois ideology which serves to conceal the contradiction of 
                                                 
80 P. Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, London, Continuum, 2001, p. 
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exploitation of the capitalist mode of production. However, if the formation of ideology 
or subjectivity is grounded on the dual determination of the mode of production and the 
ideological structure, i.e., the mode of subjectivation, it implies that it is necessary to act 
on the symbolic as well as contradiction in the real. That is to say, it is necessary to 
approach the class struggle not just in terms of the Real (in Lacanian terms) but also of 
the symbolic81in the sense that ideology is an integral part of society and thus a 
communist revolution does not simply abolish class exploitation but demands the 
constitution of a new political system based upon a new form of the imaginary: 
“ideology […] is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed and 
equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence […] it is in it and 
by it that it transforms men’s ‘consciousness’, that is, their attitudes and behaviours so as 
to raise them to the level of their tasks and the conditions of their existence”82. In other 
words, to the extent that ideology as the system of representation is not a mere reflection 
of reality but rather operates as its own mechanism, it is essential to think of an 
alternative ideological form in a revolutionary movement. This means that those 
symbols or notions are not just words hiding contradictions such as class exploitation, 
but can serve for the class struggle of the proletariat. It is Waterman who recognizes and 
develops the strategic value of symbolic struggle, and we can use his idea to clarify what 
remains latent in Althusser’s theory of ideology.83 Waterman writes:  
 
The contradiction between the propertylessness of the “great mass of humanity” and an 
“existing world of wealth and culture” has been increasing since Marx’s time. However […] we are 
witness to process of mass proletarianization (deprival of means of production) without creation of a 
majority of proletariat […] We are cognizant of a continuing or even increasing coincidence of 
propertylessness with female or minority (ethnic, religious) status. So this truly international 
contradiction has been accompanied not with a growing homogenization of the propertyless but a 
continuing heterogenization that is repeatedly restructured […] I propose a radical solution […] we 
should here take “proletariat” as a metaphor for all the alienated, all those denied their past right, their 
future potential84. 
 
Waterman’s proposition of communism as social movement, which locates 
communist movement both in the terrain of the real and of the symbolic, argues that the 
formation of global universal identity is a key factor in constituting and renewing 
communism in the new era, and this largely corresponds to what Althusser’s 
reformulation of historical causality based upon the concepts of overdetermination and 
ideology/topography. In Gramsci’s terms, it is a necessary part of revolutionary 
movement to form hegemony by working on the symbolic level. 
 
 
                                                 
81 S. Yoon, Outlines of  Generalized Marxism, cit., pp. 296-306. 
82 L. Althusser, For Marx, trans. by B. Brewster, New York, Vintage Books, 1970, p. 235. 
83 This view raises a question against Žižek, who grasps the ‘class struggle’ in the Lacanian sense (class 
struggle as an impossible). Žižek’s conceptualization of  class antagonism as a case of  the Lacanian real 
disregards the symbolic aspect of  class antagonism (the materiality of  ideology) by locating it in the real. 
84 P. Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms , cit., pp. 32-33.  
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8. The Imaginary Tradition of Council Communism 
 
To sum up, Althusser’s concept of topography raises two fundamental questions 
with regard to the theory of political organization: the necessity to find an internal 
mechanism of the political organization including the state, which Althusser himself 
tried to do with the concept of ideological state apparatus, and the necessity to reread 
the history of communist movement through the materiality of institutions. In this sense, 
we could probably try to constitute the history of council communism. Factory councils 
in the early 20th century are not the same as social unions in the contemporary world. 
Trentin’s attempt to reconstruct the labor union as the center of communist movement 
within capitalism is not the direct heir of council communism nor does it have a direct 
relationship with Waterman’s idea of communism as social movement. However, in the 
sense that they pursue communism in the form of council and mass movement, they 
provide a reference to rethink communist movements in a different way from the form 
of vanguard party. So, it is possible to construct the imaginary tradition of council 
communism which runs through factory/council communism via Trentin’s renewal of 
labor unionism to social movement unionism in response to Althusser’s critique of the 
PCF. This hypothesis, though it may have some imaginary elements, can serve as an 
index to rethink a new form for communist movements.   
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